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Abstract 
 
 
This paper discusses the moral relevance of accounting for various personal characteristics when 
prioritising between groups of patients.  After a review of the results from empirical studies, we 
inquire into the ethical reasons which might explain – and justify – the views expressed in these 
surveys.  The paper develops a general framework on the causes of ill health and the 
consequences of treatment.  It goes on to inquire into the extents to which a personal 
characteristic – and its eventual underlying ethical justification – could have any relationships to 
these causes and consequences.  We attempt to disentangle those characteristics that may 
reflect a potentially relevant reason from those which violate widely accepted principles of social 
justice. 
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The Moral Relevance of Personal Characteristics in Setting 
Health Care Priorities 
1 Introduction 
Deciding the principles on which publicly funded health care should be distributed has come to be 
a crucial health policy issue in most countries.  Much of economics is based on the efficiency 
principle of maximising health.  Partly as a critique of this principle, there has been increasing 
interest in alternative – or supplementary – dimensions with explicitly ethical origins (e.g. 
Williams, 1988).  A number of characteristics of people and their illnesses have been investigated 
to determine to what extent the population – as represented by random surveys – wish to account 
for such characteristics when setting health care priorities (e.g. Charny et al, 1989).  For example, 
should people be held responsible for own health related behaviour, or, should their importance 
to other people’s well-being count when allocating scarce health care resources? We shall refer 
to various characteristics of these sorts as personal: behavioural characteristics that may relate to 
the cause of the illness, a person’s relation to others, and characteristics of a person’s self or very 
identity. 
 
The question, then, is which characteristics are potentially policy relevant.  An implicit assumption 
in the empirical studies has been that, when the majority of the population votes for the inclusion 
of a personal characteristic then it should be taken into consideration in the decision making 
process. However, it is not necessarily true that policy makers should always adopt the result of a 
majority vote, because the public may express ethically unacceptable preferences, such as 
discrimination on the basis of race.  Therefore, we would require that a personal characteristic is 
defensible in terms of a moral argument before it is potentially policy relevant. This view is 
consistent with the argument that we should consider ‘laundered preferences’, i.e. preferences 
that are screened by ethical argument (Broome, 1991). 
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the moral relevance of various personal characteristics when 
prioritising between groups of patients. We shall do this by providing a comprehensive overview 
of the matter and articulating a preliminary ethical analysis of the issue. By way of background, 
the next section presents the results from a review of relevant empirical studies.  Section three 
inquires into the ethical reasons which might explain – and justify – the views expressed in these 
surveys.  Section four develops a general framework based upon the causes of ill health and the 
consequences of treatment.  It explores the extent to which a personal characteristic – and its 
eventual underlying ethical justification – could have any relationship to these causes and 
consequences.  We will try to disentangle characteristics that may be defended by legitimate 
ethical argument from those which merely reflect prejudices.  
2 Some empirical evidence on peoples views on 
personal characteristics  
The concept of personal characteristic in this paper will not include attributes related to those 
‘health streams’ that are central in the discussion of efficiency or distributive justice in health; a 
person’s expected health gains from treatment, her severity or her age.
1  While many empirical 
studies on personal characteristics have included age, we consider that to be related to a point in 
each person’s lifetime as distinct from characteristics which separate one individual from another. 
                                                   
1
 For discussions of these characteristics, see e.g Nord, 1995, Williams, 1997, Dolan and Olsen, 2001.  
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Rather, the types of characteristics dealt with in this paper are principally of three kinds: 1) those 
that refer to a person’s relations to other people in society (e.g. having children); 2) those that 
place the person in a causal relationship with the illness, i.e. the extent to which a particular 
illness might have been caused by own actions (e.g. smoking), and finally; 3) those that are 
‘embodied’ in a person’s self physically, intellectually or attitudinally (e.g. gender). 
 
Based on a review by Dolan and Shaw (2001) we have identified surveys that have elicited 
peoples’ views on the extents to which these types of characteristics should have any role in 
health care priority setting.  Some of these surveys investigated potentially priority relevant 
variables that are outside the scope of this paper. Some inquired into general principles, while 
other put the issue within the context of a particular case, e.g. liver transplants. The question 
presented to respondents is whether a particular attribute should be taken into account when 
prioritising scarce health care between different people. The first column of Table 1 lists the 
personal characteristics – of the kinds dealt with in this paper – that were identified in these 
studies (including references to the study/studies).  The second column gives the ordinal direction 
of any view on this characteristic, i.e. whether it was thought to give higher or lower priority. The 
third column gives the percentages of respondents in each study that answered higher or lower 
priority. More than one number in a row indicates a references to more than one study, the order 
of which follows the order of references given in the first column.  
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Table 1 Personal characteristic that have been studied empirically 
 
  Priority sign  % support 
A person’s relations to others     
single vs married (1) 
married (2) 
have children (2, 3, 4, 5) 
caring for elderly relatives (4, 5) 
‘breadwinner of the household’ (4) 
unemployed (2, 6) 
unemployed vs employed (1) 
unskilled vs director (1) 
lorry driver vs teacher (1) 
important (to the community) (2) 
employed people (5) 
rich (2) 
poor (2) 
‘lower socio-economic status’ (8)  
deprived in other ways (4) 
contributed a lot to the community (2, 4, 7) 
prisoner with criminal record (6) 
strong for latter 
no priority 
higher 
higher 
higher 
higher 
weak for latter 
equal split 
weak for latter 
lower 
higher 
lower 
higher 
higher  
higher 
higher 
lower 
 
 
20%, 33%, 16%, 47% 
15%, 45% 
3% 
3%, n.a. 
 
 
 
5% 
27% 
23% 
10% 
44% 
4% 
2%, 5%, n.a. 
n.a. 
A person’s relation to (the cause of) the illness     
‘contribute to their own illness’ (9) 
‘have taken care of their own health’ (4) 
‘self-inflicted ill health’ (10) 
smoker vs non smoker (1) 
smokers (2, 12) 
non-smokers (3) 
unhealthy diet (2) 
diet vs inherited disease (1) 
high vs low alcohol (1) 
high alcohol (2, 6, 11) 
illegal drug (2, 6)  
rarely exercise (2) 
lower 
higher 
n.a. 
strong for latter 
lower 
higher 
lower 
latter 
strong for latter 
lower 
lower 
lower 
42% 
30% 
 
 
32%, 39% 
60% 
12% 
 
 
35%, n.a., n.a. 
40%, n.a.  
20% 
A person’s self     
man vs woman (1) 
men (2) 
women (2) 
homosexual (2) 
race (2) 
weak for latter 
higher 
higher 
lower 
no priority 
 
3% 
3% 
10% 
 
     
(1) Charny et al, 1989,  (2) Dolan et al, 1999,  (3) Nord et al, 1995,  (4) Williams, 1988,   
(5) Olsen and Richardson, 1998,  (6) Neuberger et al, 1998,  (7) Skitka and Tetlock, 1992,  (8) Mooney et al, 1995,   
(9) Bowling, 1996,  (10) Edwards et al, 1999,  (11) Ratcliffe, 2000,  (12) Jowell et al, 1996.   
 
 
Table 1 suggests that most characteristics that have been investigated into concern personal 
relationships to other people, economic relationships with the wider community, and aspects of 
‘self-inflicted’ diseases. One should of course be cautious in comparing the percentage support 
across studies, because different wording have been used in the presentation of the same 
characteristic, different methodologies have been used when eliciting preferences, and different 
samples have been used. However, the picture that emerges is that people are most willing to 
favour parents of small children, and most willing to discriminate against substance users.  
People appear to be least willing to discriminate on characteristics related to a person’s self, i.e. 
gender, race and sexual orientation.  
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Apart from the one result that showed 60% support for giving non-smokers higher priority, the 
remaining comparisons did not show majority support, i.e. they are consistent with a policy of not 
discriminating on the basis personal characteristics.  Still, the minority supports for – and against 
– some of the characteristics in Table 1 are sufficiently large to warrant an inquiry into the 
possible reasons behind such views.  
3 Seeking explanations for the empirical findings 
The type of characteristics that deals with a person’s relations to other people in society could 
either be considered prospectively by judging future consequences of treatment, or 
retrospectively in terms of desert (or punishment) for past actions.  This distinction is important 
because it may call into play different ethical arguments. Utilitarian and egalitarian arguments are 
consequensialist and have thus a natural role in prospective reasoning, while the degree of 
socially meritorious behaviour reflects retrospective reasoning that is often vased in arguments 
that are ultimately neither utilitarian nor egalitarian.  
3.1 Utilitarian reasons 
From the utilitarian ‘greatest happiness principle’, all affected parties’ changed utilities are to be 
included when assessing the goodness of a programme.  The more total happiness that is 
generated, the more claims are there for health care.  In the following we shall distinguish 
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary utility, implying a corresponding division between what 
might be termed ‘pecuniary utilitarianism’ as opposed to ‘non-pecuniary utilitarianism’.  When 
account is taken of the amount of happiness among others as generated through caring and 
personal interaction, that can be referred to as non-pecuniary utilitarian reasons.  This is reflected 
in peoples’ preferences for giving priority to patients who return to care for their elderly relatives, 
or patients who return to care for their dependent children.   
 
In contrast, pecuniary utilitarian reasons refers to accounting for the happiness generated by what 
a treated patient is able to produce. The more valued one’s health-dependent skills, or the more 
one contributes to society when one is healthy, the higher total pecuniary utility the person 
generates. Together, the magnitude of the generated pecuniary and non-pecuniary utility 
comprise the concept of ‘social worth’.  Such utilitarian reasons for letting some people have 
more claims on health care have recently been suggested by Edgar et al (1998): ‘It would in 
principle, be possible to discriminate between people according to their skills and abilities, with 
those whose talents are widely recognised and appreciated being regarded as more socially 
valuable and so receiving preferential treatment’.  While many types of discriminations ‘would in 
principle be possible’ on utilitarian grounds, they may be inequitable as judged by egalitarian 
principles.  
3.2 Egalitarian reasons 
Egalitarianism involves preferences for equal shares across individuals of the entity that is to be 
distributed. There might be general egalitarianism favouring equal distributions of utility or well-
being, or more specific egalitarianism related to – in this case – health care or health. Thus, a 
preference for giving priority to people with a particular personal characteristic might be 
compensation for disadvantages in other walks of life, for example poverty or low socio-economic 
status. Giving higher priority to such groups would then act as compensation for deprivation and 
reduce inequalities in well-being. Conversely, giving lower priority to rich or important people 
could be justified on the same grounds, but also on grounds that such groups are financially 
capable of paying for themselves. Hence, such priorities might reflect preferences for distributing  
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publicly funded health care with an additional aim of reducing inequalities in life-time well-being 
across different socio-economic groups. 
3.3 Desert and merit 
Le Grand (1987, 1991) holds that past actions should impact upon an individual’s entitlement to 
health care; that honourable social actions make people more deserving later in life for health 
care, and that criminal activities should reduce one’s entitlements.  The empirical evidence 
suggested only weak support for such retrospective concerns (as indicated by the support for and 
against the characteristics ‘contributed a lot to the community’, and ‘prisoners with criminal 
record’).  The distinction between whether the past actions have been good or bad suggests that 
society might look back in anger or honour when prioritising resources between individuals. This 
implies that the health service can make additional rewards or punishment – like an all mighty 
Supreme Court.  However, a more convincing ethical argument to us, is that when atonement 
have been made for past bad actions through the legal system, criminals become free citizens 
who thereby also regain their entitlements to public services such as health care. 
 
Past good actions have – by definition – a connotation of altruism or duty to them, such as 
‘contributed a lot’ or ‘honourable’.  It is interesting to note that rewarding social goodness might, in 
fact, undermine the motivation for good actions.  Extrinsic rewards may reduce intrinsic motives. 
This may be illustrated in the market for blood where payment has allegedly resulted in a 
reduction in supply, because the goodness in the act of donation was devalued (Titmuss, 1970). 
 
In the same way as a distinction can be drawn between the impacts on others health and others 
wealth when looking prospectively, there is a parallel when looking retrospectively: Past actions 
could have impacted upon other peoples’ health or upon other people’s wealth. An example of 
the former is a person who has rescued the life of a fellow citizen, and has harmed himself as a 
direct consequence of that venture. In this case, we would find the life-saver to have increased 
entitlements to health care, because his need for health care is directly related to the past action. 
As such, it represents a kind of desert which differs from an idea of being a generally more 
deserving citizen due to past good actions which would be unrelated to the current health care 
need, e.g. having been a philanthropist.  However, rather than suggesting that efforts directed to 
improving other people’s health are in general more virtuous than are efforts directed to 
improving deprived people’s general well-being, there appears to be two more important ethical 
concerns. They are, first; whether a person’s need for health care is a direct result of her virtuous 
actions, and second; whether the person’s efforts have already been rewarded in any way, i.e. 
voluntary efforts are more meritorious than paid. 
3.4 Exogenous and endogenous causes 
The second kind of characteristics discussed in this paper concerns the person in relation to the 
illness. The emphasis here is on the extent to which the causes of the illness are exogenous to 
the person, or whether the causes could be explained by a person’s own (unhealthy or risky) 
behaviour.  According to Edgar et al (1998): ‘It is possible to argue that QALY gains from treating 
ill-health which is brought about as a result of individual’s own behaviour (smoking, drinking, 
engaging in dangerous sports, etc) should be of lower value than those from treating ill-health for 
whom the victim was blameless. By the same token, more weight may be given to health benefits 
provided to those whose health has suffered through factors outside their control such as 
deprivation or unemployment’.  Again, while these authors hold that ‘it is possible to argue’, they 
offer no reasons in support of their assertions.  The moral reasons we would suggest are based 
on our distinction between exogenous and endogenous causes of ill-health.   
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Equity and misfortune are the two sets of reasons for giving more weight to those who have 
suffered through factors outside own control, i.e. exogenous causes. As for equity, the issue is 
one of compensating for inequalities in life-time health or well-being.  People with inherited 
diseases would initially have experienced less health, and so would people who are deprived due 
to the physical or social environment.  Thus, there is a straight forward equity argument for giving 
more health care which would produce more QALY gains to these groups than to groups whose 
expected life-time health are greater, i.e. compensation for deprivation. 
 
The other reason is more directly related to the exogenous nature of some factors.  Misfortune – 
or ‘blameless’ is the flip-side of blame.  Some have been unlucky in the biological lottery to be 
born with an inherited disease.  And some have been the victims of external environmental 
factors, e.g. diseases mainly attributable to a poor working environment.  A direct exogenous link 
would be if victim of an identified inflictor, e.g. being hit by a car on a pavement.  In such cases of 
complete innocence, there appears to be an additional claim on health care.  This implies 
compensation for misfortune. 
 
As for endogenous causes, ill-health would rarely be entirely attributable to a person’s own 
actions. Even with ‘life-style diseases’ most variations in who contracts a disease are 
unexplained.  Nevertheless, smokers are probably the most frequently used example of a group 
who contracts ‘self-inflicted’ diseases, for which – it is argued – they should be held personal 
responsible. There are two very different arguments for punishing those whose unhealthy 
preferences are manifested in an unhealthy life-style, and for whom there is a higher probability 
that their current ill-health has been caused by their chosen life-style.  First, there is the simple 
economic burden argument that ‘smokers should pay their way’.  However, if smokers pay more 
than their excess health care costs through tobacco taxes, and adjusting for differences in 
pension pay-outs, this argument is not valid (Menzel, 1990).  The second argument has more of a 
moralistic overtone and is based on the idea that we have a duty to live healthy; ‘risk aversion as 
a higher moral order’.  Those who disobey would be punished by having less claims on health 
care.
2  
 
Returning to our three types of personal characteristics, it seems difficult to find arguments that 
are based on ethical reasoning in support of the listed characteristics that are ‘embodied’ in a 
person’s self.  Rather, these characteristics – which happens to be the least explored and yielding 
the lowest relative supports – give associations to various types of prejudices; such as sexism, 
homophobia, racism.  Furthermore, suggesting that such characteristics should influence priority 
setting violates a key health policy objective of many countries’ public health services; i.e. that of 
equal access for equal need, independent of inter alia gender, sexual orientation, race.  Within the 
general framework developed below, we inquire into the extents to which a personal 
characteristic – and its eventual underlying ethical justification – could have any relationships to 
the causes of ill health or the consequences of treatment.  It turns out that personal characteristics 
embodied in a person’s self seem to fall outside this framework. 
                                                   
2
  See the concept of ‘healthism’ in Skrabanek, 1994.  
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4 Causes of ill health and consequences of treatment 
4.1 The starting point: outcomes and severity 
The discussion above suggests that a person’s claims on health care could be determined by 
characteristics of that person beyond her health care needs. First, with respect to the policy 
objective of ‘equal access for equal need’, a clarification of the concept of need is needed (see 
e.g. Culyer and Wagstaff 1993, Olsen 1997).  If need is interpreted as ‘capacity to benefit’, then 
what matters in determining one’s claim for health care resources is the impact of health care on 
health gains – only.  There is a causal production function relationship between health care and 
expected positive health outcomes.  This argument is illustrated in Figure 1, in which the (bolded) 
causation arrow from health care to health outcomes determines the (dotted) claim arrow ￿ from 
health outcomes to health care.  An alternative interpretation of need is ‘need as ill health’, i.e. that 
a patient’s severity (or ‘no-treatment profile’) is important in society’s judgements of her 
entitlement to health care.  There is, however, no causation arrow between ill health and health 
care, but a claim arrow ￿ which reflects a societal preference for prioritising the most severely ill 
patients.   
 
Figure 1 ‘Need as ill-health’ and ‘need as capacity to benefit’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The concept of claim refers to ‘a duty owed to the candidate herself that she should have [the 
good]’ (Broome 1991). Alternatively, claims could of a more communitarian nature in that they ‘fall 
to the community to exercise duty over’, and ‘claims do not have to be recognised by the 
individual who has the claims’ (Mooney 1998).  However, claims appear to bear some 
resemblance to need, since the latter concept carries ‘significant ethical overtones; its allegation 
asserts an obligation on others’ (Evans 1984). In the following, we shall use the word claim to 
express the extent to which a personal characteristic represents a legitimate reason for society 
having a higher or lower obligation to that particular person (or group of persons) when deciding 
on priorities in health care. 
 
2 
1 
ill health 
 
health 
care 
individual 
health outcome 
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Our starting point for the conceptual framework to be spelt out below is that a person’s claims for 
health care depends on needs, i.e. her individual expected health outcomes and/or the severity of 
her current ill health.  In the context of cost-effectiveness analyses, what matters is the impacts of 
health care on the patient’s own health outcomes – i.e. ‘need as capacity to benefit’.  More 
recently, methodological contributions have been made in attempting to weight the importance of 
severity with that of gains (see e.g. Nord 1993).  Thus, what matters is illustrated by the two claim 
arrows, ￿ and ￿, in Figure 1. This model will now be put within a wider context, which suggests 
that additional claims – beyond the aforementioned conceptions of needs – depend crucially on 
the causes of ill health and the wider consequences of an individual’s improved health. 
4.2 The determinants of (ill) health 
The framework for the determinants of ill health, as depicted in Figure 2, is influenced by some 
models by Evans and Stoddart (1990) that consider three determining factors; genetic 
endowment, the physical environment and the social environment, which produce ‘host’ 
responses in the individual. These responses, then, reflect ‘social conditioning’ as well as more 
biological reactions to the environment. The variable ‘genetics’ refer to natural variations in 
human biology and explains inherited diseases. This is analytically separated from the whole 
range of environment-factors; be it one’s physical environment including working conditions and 
pollution, and the social environment including cultural norms and one’s position in the social 
hierarchy. 
 
However, a model that explains revealed ‘lifestyle’ purely in terms of individual responses to the 
environment becomes rather deterministic.  At the other extreme are models that consider 
lifestyle purely as revealing private sovereign choices.  A more fruitful approach is to consider 
‘lifestyle’ to be determined by factors over which individuals have different degrees of discretion, 
like a spectrum from constraints on the life one can possibly live to those factors over which one 
might have complete discretion. We have therefore completed the picture by adding ‘preferences’ 
as a determinant to reflect variations in individual choices – or ‘tastes’.  A particular preference 
per se is not unhealthy.  It is when a preference is being revealed through behaviour that it may 
become healthy or unhealthy. 
 
Thus, a health related lifestyle depends upon a combination of individual responses to the 
environment, and individual choices based on her sovereign preferences.  While there are moral 
and ideological disagreements as to which actions a person should be held responsible for, i.e. 
whether it is a response or a choice, our suggestion that individuals have different degrees of 
autonomy when making lifestyle choices should be less controversial. 
 
In the model illustrated in Figure 2, there are three exogenous determinants of (ill) health; i) 
genetics, ii) the environment (physical and social), and iii) preferences.  In reality, they are not 
completely independent of each other, but for simplification the possible arrows between each of 
them are not drawn in this figure (e.g. there could be an arrow from preferences to social 
environment to reflect the view that people to some extent choose their environment.)  Among 
these exogenous determinants, genetics and environment are – in principle – directly observable, 
while preferences are not.  The way preferences become observable is in the lifestyle, but again, 
this lifestyle is influenced by individual responses to the former exogenous determinants. While 
lifestyle could refer to any sort of behaviour (be it transvestism or smoking), in this context we 
narrow it to those styles that are known to have a health related causality, such as diet, exercise 
and substance use.  
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Figure 2 A framework of causes and consequences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our emphasis on identifying ‘health related lifestyle’ within this map of causation is justified on the 
grounds that this variable is often associated with self-inflicted diseases, for which, some would 
argue, individuals should be held responsible.  However, the model suggests that a ‘lifestyle-
disease’ is not just self-inflicted, but rather caused by a mental or biological response to the 
environment in which the person lives. Hence, it appears that an unhealthy lifestyle which follows 
from unhealthy individual tastes (discretion) are more blameworthy than were the same lifestyle 
to be explained as a part of the culture (constraint) within which the person lives. 
 
Having described this map of causation, the question then is which of these determinants of ill 
health might be legitimate reasons for assigning more or less claims on health care.  It appears 
that society consider people who have suffered from misfortune by nature to have more claims, 
as illustrated by the claim arrow ￿.  Among the personal characteristics listed in Table 1, 
‘inherited disease’ would be one associated with this claim arrow.  The claim arrow ￿ indicates 
compensation for various kinds of exogenous environmental causes, most often related to social 
deprivations.  The personal characteristics in Table 1 that we would associate with this claim 
arrow are; ‘deprived in other ways’, ‘lower socio-economic status’, ‘poor’, ‘unemployed’.  
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Conversely, the suggestion to assign ‘rich’ people lower priority might be explained by ideas that 
such people are fortunate in other respects, or that they are able to pay for themselves.   
 
The claim arrow ￿ suggests a view that people should be held responsible for their own actions. 
To the extent that a person – based on her preferences – has chosen a particular unhealthy 
lifestyle, they are then to be punished by less claims on health care; ‘self-inflicted ill health’, 
‘contribute to their own illness’. Conversely, Table 1 suggest that those who ‘have taken care of 
their own health’ should be rewarded.  The remaining characteristics under the heading A 
person’s relation to (the cause of) ill health in Table 1 reveal various degrees of blame for 
lifestyles with ‘unhealthy diet’, ‘rarely exercise’ or substance use.  These views appear to reflect a 
perception of these factors to be of a kind that individuals have fairly wide discretions over; i.e. 
that unhealthy behaviour is something people freely choose, not something that they respond to 
automatically as a result of an unhealthy social environment.  
4.3 The consequences of treatment 
There appears to be two different types of consequences for other people resulting from an 
individual’s improved health.  The first deals with the personal impact on those other people with 
whom one has a personal relationship, i.e. the non-pecuniary benefits. The second type refers to 
the pecuniary impacts.  In Figure 2, a distinction is made between consequences on other 
peoples’ health related wellbeing, and on other peoples’ wealth related wellbeing.
3 It follows that 
the more positive impacts of the former kind, the higher claims – based on the above concept of 
non-pecuniary utilitarianism – would the person have on health care; arrow ￿.  And, the more 
economic contributions to society (termed ‘indirect benefits’ or ‘production gains’ in the economic 
evaluation literature), the higher one’s claims on health care; arrow ￿.  This arrow would then be 
justified by the notion of pecuniary utilitarianism. Going back to Table 1 again, the former would 
be associated with personal characteristics such as ‘have children’, ‘caring for elderly relatives’ 
and ‘married’, while the latter would refer to ‘breadwinner’, ‘employed people’.  
 
Comparing the percentage support reported in Table 1, people seem to believe that the personal 
impacts represent more legitimate claims than the economic impacts. This could be explained by 
different degrees of replaceability. With regard to the personal impacts one has on friends and 
family, an individual is largely irreplaceable. However, we are all replaceable with regard to 
economic impacts (e.g. being breadwinners and tax-payers).  
5 Discussion and conclusion 
The issue of taking account of certain differences in personal characteristics when setting health 
care priorities is indeed problematic, both conceptually and practically.  Traditional economics 
avoids the moral problem by the principle of the sanctity of consumer sovereignty in which 
‘preferences are preferences’ – that is, whatever characteristics people want to count should 
count.  No attempts are made to distinguish between prejudices and ethically defensible reasons.  
Among ethicists, the moral aspects of concepts like ‘desert’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘social worth’ are 
discussed, but are often not related to the contexts in which these concepts become relevant to 
setting health care priorities.  
 
                                                   
3
  We are not accounting for own wealth related well-being as generated from increased income. The reasons for excluding such 
outcomes would either be the ‘double counting’-argument (Weinstein et al, 1997) or the normative view that differences in own 
consumption should be ignored; otherwise, the higher own personal consumption, the more claim on health care (Olsen and 
Richardson, 1999).  
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In this paper, we have tried to separate out those personal characteristics which have potential 
moral relevance from those which are not.  We have suggested that a characteristic is potentially 
relevant if it is related to a cause of ill health or the consequence of treatment.  Beyond this 
framework, the relevance of the different characteristics that have been studied empirically (Table 
1) is now summed up in Table 2 and ‘cross-checked’ against various ethical reasons.  The first 
three columns reflect consequentialism.  The utilitarian reasons have in this paper been 
subdivided into being of pecuniary or non-pecuniary kinds.  The egalitarian reasons involve 
attempts at offsetting inequalities in health or well-being.  The last two columns have a non-
consequential basis.  There are two reasons for retrospection into past actions; desert (and 
blame) refer to the issue of whether a person’s interaction with other people have been 
meritorious or blameworthy, and; responsibility which refer to the extent to which the person could 
be held responsible for her ill health through past unhealthy behaviour.   
 
We can think of a range of well founded reasons against having particular personal 
characteristics count when determining entitlements to health care might reflect. A crucial issue 
here is to what extent discrimination against – or in favour of – specific groups of people 
represents significant harm to other people. Furthermore, one may disapprove of the inclusion of 
a characteristic if that would come into conflict with widely shared community values, which could 
be signified in general health policy objectives such as access independently of the particular 
characteristic.   
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Table 2 The relevance/irrelevance of personal characteristic 
 
Ethical reasons 
Utilitarian  Past actions 
 
Pecun-
iary 
Non-
pecun-
iary 
Egalitarian 
Desert 
re others 
Respons- 
ibility 
re illness 
A person’s relations to others 
Married 
have children 
caring for elderly relatives 
rare skills, employed, rich 
unemployed, poor 
past contributions 
criminal record 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
– 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A person’s relation to the illness 
inherited disease 
‘taken care of own health’; 
      non-smokers 
‘self-inflicted ill health’; 
      smokers, rarely exercise, 
      unhealthy diet, high alcohol 
illegal drug  
    + 
– 
 
– 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
A person’s self 
Gender 
homosexual 
race 
         
 
The first three characteristics in Table 2 have relevance from a non-pecuniary utilitarian reason (+ 
in the second column), but the first of them appears to be weakest. A counter argument is a 
principle of equal rights independent of marital status.  Characteristics related to a person’s 
economic importance (rare skills, employed, rich) can all be supported on the basis of ‘pecuniary 
utilitarianism’, but it would imply inequitable distribution of health gains, as well as unequal 
access to health care. Giving priority to unemployed or poor people is usually justified on the 
ground that it would reduce inequalities in well-being (+ in the third column).  
 
The subsequent personal characteristics on ‘past contribution’ and ‘criminal record’ fell out of our 
framework illustrated in Figure 2, as they have nothing to do with the cause of ill health, nor with 
the consequence of cure.  However, such characteristics become relevant on the basis of desert 
and merit, i.e. how we relate to other people in society might influence our entitlements to public 
goods.  Based on this view, one would assign higher priority to those with socially approved past 
actions (contributions) and lower priority to disapproved past actions (criminal) (+ in the fourth 
column, signalling that desert/blame reasons are relevant).  Our counter arguments are based on 
social justice. It seems to us that only when current need for health care is a direct consequence 
of an activity intended to improve the well-being of fellow citizens, is the idea of desert morally 
relevant. As for past criminal behaviour, it seems that only when atonement has not yet been 
made might one’s entitlements be reduced.  Otherwise, good and bad past actions should be 
‘cleared’ in the relevant spheres and sectors of the society; in terms of honour and social 
approval, or in terms of punishments within the legal system.  It is not for the health service to 
assign limited or increased entitlements to its services depending on differences in past 
(unrelated) actions.  
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The second type of personal characteristics concern a person’s relation to the illness, and are 
justified primarily on the ground that people have a responsibility to live a healthy life.
4 Of the 
different characteristics discussed in this paper, the one which is most hotly debated is whether 
‘self-inflicted ill health’ should reduce a person’s claims for health care (+ in the fifth column, 
signalling that responsibility reasons are relevant). The flip side – whether those who have ‘taken 
care of own health’ and thereby increased their claims – is based on the same ethical argument, 
namely that we have a duty to live a healthy life and avoid unnecessary use of collective 
resources. 
 
The counter arguments are of two kinds. First, from Figure 2, many would argue that health 
related lifestyle is better described as an individual’s response to the environment and social 
conditioning, than a reflection of sovereign choices. At a population level, a strong socio-
economic gradient exists to explain a large degree of variations in individual health related 
lifestyle preferences.  In any case, socio-economic variations often explain more of the variation 
in health than preference related lifestyle variations. Thus, giving higher priority to those who lead 
healthy lives implies more weight to the socially fortunate. Conversely, less priority to unhealthy 
behaviour implies ‘victim-blaming’ of people living in socially unfortunate environments (– in the 
third column because such a policy might accentuate inequalities).  The second argument against 
letting lifestyle matter appears to have a basis in medical ethics; what matters is the state one is 
in – not the cause of the disease.
5  As to the characteristic ‘illegal drug’, the reason for letting this 
have an impact is again that of personal (ir)responsibility; drug users should know that these 
substances are detrimental to their health. Furthermore, a rights based reason would be that such 
behaviour is – by definition – illegal. However, a counter argument which is also based on the 
notion of just procedures is that the health service is there to treat people in need, not to pass 
verdicts on people whose substance abuse is illegal. 
 
It is hard to find any ethical reason which might justify the moral relevance of the third kind of 
personal characteristics related to a person’s self. They all violate important principles of human 
tolerance. 
 
We have not sought to consider the practical implications of the various moral arguments 
considered in this paper and, of course, it may be impractical to attempt to implement policies 
suggested by ethical arguments. The framework illustrated in Figure 2 might still be used when 
determining the extent to which more or less health care funding should be allocated to certain 
programme areas over and above that suggested by conventional cost-effectiveness analyses. 
For example, more health care could be allocated to those in worse health (arrow ￿).  Or more 
could be allocated to handicapped or deprived groups for compensatory reasons (arrows ￿ and 
￿), or more resources could be spent on changing the environmental determinants of unhealthy 
behaviour. As to those aspects of lifestyle on which people have significant personal discretion 
(e.g. diet, exercise, smoking – see arrow ￿), information campaigns and the price mechanism 
could be used to alter individual choices. Some countries have already implemented programmes 
by which the health service give higher priority depending on ‘social worth’.  In Norway, patients 
who can return to work earlier would in some instances get preferential treatment (arrow ￿).  
                                                   
4
  An exception in Table 2 is ‘inherited disease’, whose relevance appear to lie in an idea of reducing inequalities in life time health, 
but also compensating those who have been unlucky in the biological lottery. 
5
  A Norwegian Commission on Priority Setting in Health Care held that citizens should have equal rights to health care 
independent of their past health related behaviour. They argued that it is not for the curative sector to punish past behaviour, but 
for the preventive sector to alter future behaviour.   
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This practice seems in contradiction to peoples’ views that differences in economic contributions 
are irrelevant, while differences in social and personal impacts are more relevant (arrow ￿).  
More research is necessary to sustain or reject this apparent contradiction.   
 
More generally there has been too little empirical research to draw strong conclusions about  
peoples’ social preferences. There has been even less research to distinguish ethical based 
considerations from prejudices. Constructive research should focus upon the former only but to 
achieve this would probably require greater emphasis upon qualitative research designed to 
probe people’s beliefs and motivations. In this paper, we have attempted to lay out an overview 
which might be considered a preliminary moral analysis for future research. 
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